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Abstract:  
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder affecting voluntary motor control. 
However, little is known about the experience of voluntary action in PD patients. A key 
component of action experience is the feeling of controlling one’s own actions, and through 
them, external events. In healthy individuals this Sense of Agency (SoA) is associated with a 
subjective compression of time, such that actions and their effects are perceived as bound 
together across time. This action-effect binding provides an indirect measure of SoA.  Nine 
PD patients and age-matched controls judged the time of voluntary actions and of an auditory 
effect (a tone) of the action.  The pattern of results resembled previous studies, with the 
perceived time of actions showing a shift towards the subsequent tone, relative to a baseline 
condition involving actions without tones.  Similarly, the perceived times of tones showed a 
shift towards the preceding action that caused the tone, relative to a baseline condition 
involving tones only. The patients were tested both on and off dopaminergic medication. PD 
patients off medication showed no significant change in action-effect binding relative to 
controls. Conversely, PD patients on medication showed a significant increase in action-
effect binding relative to their own performance off medication.  Increased availability of 
dopamine strengthened the experience of association between actions and external events, 
enhancing the sense of agency.  These results shed light on the contribution of dopamine to 
the experience of instrumental action, and also on impulse control disorders and psychosis in 
medicated PD patients. 
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Introduction 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a degenerative disorder characterised by motor impairments, 
including bradykinesia and difficulty initiating voluntary movement.  The core pathology is 
the loss of dopamine in the nigrostriatal pathway (Agid & Blin, 1987), resulting in reduced 
drive in the cortical-basal ganglia-cortical loops (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986).  
Accordingly, dopaminergic drugs form the standard treatment. 
 
Whilst dopaminergic medication alleviates motor impairments in PD, its effect on cognitive 
function is more variable; improving certain cognitive functions, but worsening others 
(Gotham, Brown, & Marsden, 1986).  The role of dopamine in cognitive function remains a 
topic of intense interest (e.g. Pillon, Czernecki, & Dubois, 2003; Dagher & Robbins, 2009), 
but is still poorly understood.  The ‘overdose theory’ of dopaminergic medication (Gotham et 
al., 1986; Gotham, Brown, & Marsden, 1988; Swainson et al., 2000; Cools, Barker, Sahakian, 
& Robbins, 2001; Cools, 2006) offers an explanation for variable of dopamine effects on 
cognition in PD.  According to this theory, earlier stages of PD involve severe DA depletion 
in the dorsal striatum. Therefore, cognitive functions supported by DA activity in this region 
are improved by dopaminergic medication. In contrast, there is little DA depletion in the 
ventral striatum at this stage. Therefore cognitive functions supported by DA activity in this 
region are worsened by dopaminergic medication as it induces an excess, or overdose, of DA.  
 
Here we focus on the effects of PD and DA on a set of key functions that involve both 
cognitive and motor processes, namely the sense of control in operant actions.  In the animal 
literature the same functions have been studied under the concept of instrumental learning.  
Instrumental learning is one such function thought to be supported by ventral DA systems 
(Kelley, Smith-Roe, & Holahan, 1997; Smith-Roe & Kelley, 2000; Hernandez, Sadeghian, & 
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Kelley, 2002; O'Doherty et al., 2004). Dopaminergic neurons play a crucial role in prediction 
of rewards (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Tobler, 
Dickinson, & Schultz, 2003), while dopaminergic areas such as the striatum play an 
important role in reinforcement learning (e.g. O’Doherty et al., 2004).  Consistent with the 
overdose theory of dopaminergic medication in PD, performance on reversal learning tasks, 
which depend on learning of instrumental contingencies, is preserved off medication but 
impaired on medication (Swainson et al., 2000; Cools et al., 2001). Moreover, dopaminergic 
medication appears to exaggerate PD patients’ sensitivity to action outcomes and rewards 
(Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004).  Such results suggest that the formation of action-effect 
associations in PD might be exaggerated when on dopaminergic medication. 
 
In humans at least, actions that produce or predict rewards are associated with a specific 
experience of voluntary motor control, termed ‘Sense of Agency’ (SoA; Frith, 2005).  This 
refers to the experience of being in control over one’s own actions, and, through them, over 
events in the outside world, and has been shown to reflect knowledge about the causal 
relation between actions and outcomes (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & 
Haggard, 2009).  Altered SoA features in several psychiatric (e.g. schizophrenia; Frith, 1992) 
and neurological (e.g. alien hand syndrome; Doody & Jankovic, 1992) disorders, suggesting 
that it reflects specific brain processes.  One might also expect PD patients to experience 
disturbances in SoA, given their difficulty in initiating and controlling voluntary movement. 
Indeed, striatal dopamine depletion disrupts the drive from the basal ganglia to frontal motor 
areas such as the supplementary and pre-supplementary motor areas (Cunnington et al., 2001; 
MacDonald & Halliday, 2002; Grafton, 2004; Playford et al., 1992; Nachev, Kennard, & 
Husain, 2008) which play a role in generating SoA (Haggard & Whitford, 2004). Although 
PD clearly involves deficits in higher order aspects of motor cognition (Falkenstein et al., 
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2001; Rowe et al., 2002; Willemssen, Müller, Schwarz, Falkenstein, & Beste, 2009), no 
studies, to our knowledge, have specifically investigated SoA during PD, nor the relation 
between SoA and dopamine levels. 
  
Classically, SoA has been tested in action-recognition tasks requiring explicit judgements of 
agency.  The participant is given visual feedback of a voluntary action that is spatially 
(Daprati et al., 1997) or temporally (Farrer et al., 2008) distorted, and asked if their action is 
responsible for the viewed feedback or not.  However, these explicit judgements of agency 
over feedback require that some other possible cause of the feedback exists (“the computer”, 
or another person).  They may therefore fail to capture the normal background feeling of 
being in control of one’s everyday actions. Moreover, important functional dissociations 
between feelings of agency (such as binding) and judgements of agency have been described.  
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). 
 
 A reliable, implicit and quantitative correlate of SoA is the attraction between the perceived 
time of actions and of their effects in the “intentional binding” paradigm (Haggard et al., 
2002; see Figure 1). In this paradigm, participants are asked to judge the time of actions (e.g. 
key presses) and effects (e.g. tones), using a clock hand rotating around a clock face. 
Typically, participants perceive their voluntary actions as occurring later when they are 
followed by an external effect (e.g., a tone), compared to actions not followed by an effect.  
Conversely, participants perceive external effects as occurring earlier when preceded by a 
voluntary action, compared to external effects not preceded by a voluntary action.  Prolonged 
action-effect intervals, random intervals (Haggard et al., 2002), or effects occurring in the 
absence of actions, all weaken binding, suggesting that it follows the traditional pattern of 
associative, causal learning.  Furthermore, involuntary movements produced a reversal of the 
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binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002) with the movements perceived as earlier and the effects 
perceived as later than those same events in isolation. In this way, voluntary actions and 
effects are bound in conscious experience, whilst involuntary movements and effects are 
separated in conscious experience. Furthermore, no binding occurs between pairs of sensory 
stimuli (Haggard, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Gehrke, 2002) or between involuntary movements 
and subsequent effects (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) or for actions that others are 
observed to make (Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008). Therefore, the subjective 
shortening of the action-effect interval is a useful quantitative measure for the sense of 
agency. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
We have investigated the role of dopamine in SoA by measuring intentional binding in PD. If 
dopamine boosts action-effect associations, then we might expect the intentional binding 
effect to be greater in PD patients on than off medication.  We also compared measures from 
PD patients with age-matched healthy controls. 
 
Methods 
The study was approved by UCLH Ethical Committee.  Patients and volunteers participated 
on the basis of written informed consent, and in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Participants 
Nine patients with idiopathic PD were recruited from the PD clinics at the National Hospital 
for Neurology and Neurosurgery, London (see Table 1 for patient details). Inclusion criteria 
were: idiopathic PD according to UK Parkinson's Disease Society Brain Bank clinical 
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diagnostic criteria; age 55-80 years; on dopaminergic medication; no current depressive 
illness; no known dementia based on prior cognitive assessment; Hoehn and Yahr stages 2 or 
3 at last clinic visit. Exclusion criteria included presence of features suggestive of a diagnosis 
other than idiopathic PD (like atypical Parkinsonism), presence of an impulse control 
disorder (such as medication overuse, punding etc.), and adverse reactions to withdrawal or 
delay of dopaminergic medication.  
 
Patients completed two testing sessions (off and on) on the same day. Patients were kept off 
Levodopa (L-dopa) overnight and also withheld from morning doses of all antiparkinsonian 
medication on the day of the experiment, in order to induce an off state. After completion of 
the task patients immediately took their medication and returned after 1 hour to repeat the 
task in the on state. Just as on patients may not be maximally on, so the off state is not as 
great as could have been achieved by prolonged withdrawal. However, the withdrawal period 
was sufficient to induce a clinically significant change in symptoms (see Table 1).  
Participants were asked to stop short-acting dopaminergic medications (standard preparations 
of L-dopa and short-acting dopamine agonists) at least 12 h before the experiment, and long 
acting preparations (like controlled release preparations of L-dopa) at least 24 h before the 
experiment. Several patients were taking dopamine agonists alone or in combination with L-
dopa (see Table 1). 
 
9 age-matched healthy controls were recruited from a database of participants from the same 
institution (see Table 1).  None had a current neurological or psychiatric history. Control 
patients were tested on the same task in a single session. Control subjects were not treated 
with L-dopa.  
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Table 1 about here 
 
Experimental design 
PD patients and controls made judgements about the perceived time of voluntary actions and 
of tones that followed voluntary actions.  Their mean judgements were used to calculate a 
measure of “intentional binding”, an implicit measure of agency.  The procedure was based 
on that developed by Haggard, Clark, and Kalogeras (2002). The trial structure for the 
experimental agency conditions is shown in Figure 2. In these conditions, participants were 
instructed to press a key with their right index finger at a time of their choosing.  A response 
key with an area of 5cm² was used to ensure patients had no trouble pressing the key.  This 
key press then caused a brief tone (duration 75 ms) to occur 250ms later. At the same time, a 
clock hand was rotating about a clock face at a rate of one revolution every 2560ms (Libet, 
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). The clock hand then continued rotating for a random time, 
and then stopped.  The participant was prompted to report verbally the position of the clock 
hand at which they pressed the key, or the time at which they heard the tone onset. Action 
and tone judgements were blocked, so that in each experimental condition the participant 
always judged just actions, or just tones. Each condition consisted of 20 trials. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
There were two additional baseline conditions, each 20 trials long. In the baseline action 
condition participants made a key press at a time of their choosing. This key press did not 
cause a tone, and participants simply judged the time of their key press. In the baseline tone 
condition, participants were instructed not to press the key and instead wait for a tone to be 
delivered at a random latency generated by the computer. Participants judged the time of tone 
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onset. Agency and baseline blocks were intermixed, and the order was randomised anew for 
each session. 
 
PD patients were tested both on and off medication. At the end of each patient testing session 
(i.e. after off and on medication sessions) a qualified neurologist assessed motor disability 
using the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale motor examination (UPDRS-III; Fahn & 
Elton, 1987). 
 
Data analysis 
Because individuals differ widely in their biases on cross-modal time-estimation tasks, time 
estimates in a single condition are not particularly informative.  However, these biases may 
be removed by analysing differences between estimates of the same physical event in 
different conditions.  Our interest lay in how action-effect associations might modulate the 
experience of action and tone.  Therefore, we subtracted the perceived time of actions in the 
baseline action only condition of each session from the perceived time of actions in the 
agency (action +tone) condition of the same session.  Similarly, we subtracted the perceived 
time of baseline tones in each session from the perceived time of tones caused by actions in 
the same session.   
 
This procedure gives a measure of the shift in awareness, or binding, for actions and for tones 
in the agency condition. By convention a positive shift indicates delayed awareness, while a 
negative shift indicates anticipatory awareness. In this way, positive shifts for actions and 
negative shifts for tones indicate a perceptual attraction or binding between action and effect.  
Therefore, we computed an overall binding measure for each participant (mean action shifts 
minus mean tone shifts), and analysed the overall binding measure statistically. This 
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combined measure corresponds to the perceived linkage between action and effect, and 
provides an implicit, quantitative measure of SoA (Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard & Clark, 
2003; Engbert et al., 2008).  We compared overall binding scores in controls and PD patients 
off medication to test whether PD itself is associated with changes in SoA.  We also 
compared overall binding scores in PD patients off medication and those same patients on 
medication. 
 
Results 
UPDRS scores were significantly higher off medication (mean = 27.00) than on (mean = 
16.11), t(8) = 8.34, p = .00003.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
The shifts in perceived time of events in agency conditions relative to the appropriate 
baseline are shown in Table 2 and Figure 3 for each group (control, PD off, and PD on).  
Since the direction of shifts in action and tone awareness relative to baseline follows directly 
from the concept of binding, and from previous studies (Haggard et al., 2002), we used 1-
tailed t-tests to confirm the binding effects in each group/session.  These are also shown in 
Table 2. As can be seen from the table, the intentional binding effect is present in all three 
groups (control, PD off, and PD on).  Specifically, actions were perceived later when they 
were followed by a tone, than in a baseline condition without a tone (although this effect only 
reaches the borderline of significance for control participants, p = 0.054).  Tones produced by 
voluntary actions were perceived earlier than baseline tones.  Tone binding was both 
numerically larger and statistically more reliable than action binding, as in previous studies 
(Haggard et al., 2002).  Finally, the composite binding measure, reflecting both action and 
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tone binding, was also statistically significant, again on 1-tailed testing (see final column 
Table 2).  The composite binding data implies that participants perceived the action-effect 
interval as significantly shorter than it really was, although the interval duration was not 
judged directly. 
 
We then proceeded to compare the degree of binding between the various groups in our 
study.  PD patients on medication showed greatest binding for both actions and tones, 
followed by PD patients off¸ followed by controls. Two-tailed t-tests were used to investigate 
differences in binding between groups/sessions.  These showed that action binding did not 
differ between PD off and controls, t(16), p = .500 (2-tailed), nor between PD off and on, t(8) 
= 1.08, p = .314 (2-tailed).  Similarly, tone binding did not differ between PD off and 
controls, t(16) = .512, p = .615 (2-tailed), nor between PD off and on medication, t(8) = 1.34, 
p = .216 (2-tailed).   However, our principal interest focussed on the overall level of binding, 
as a reflection of the total linkage between action and effect, rather than on either actions or 
effects individually. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Overall binding in PD patients off medication (mean = 122ms) was not significantly different 
from overall binding in healthy controls (mean = 92ms), t(16) = .800, p = .435 (2-tailed). This 
suggests that PD itself is not associated with abnormal action awareness or SoA. However, as 
predicted, overall binding in PD patients on medication (mean = 186ms) was significantly 
greater than in the same PD patients off medication (mean = 122ms), t(8) = 2.71, p = .027 (2-
tailed). This suggests that dopaminergic medication enhanced the experience of agency in PD 
patients.  
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Table 2 suggests differences in baseline judgements between the groups. Baseline action 
judgements showed no significant differences between controls and PD off, t(16) = 1.350, p = 
.196 (2-tailed), or controls and PD on, t(16) = .425, p = .504 (2-tailed). However, there was a 
near significant difference between baseline action judgements in PD off and PD on, t(8) = 
2.126, p = .066 (2-tailed). For baseline tone judgements, none of the comparisons were 
significant (PD on vs. PD off:  t(8) = 1.519, p = .167; PD on vs. Control: t(16) = 1.433, p = 
.171; PD off vs. Control: t(16) = .456, p = .504 – all 2-tailed) 
 
Consistency of time estimation 
In a further analysis we compared the standard deviations across repeated trials of time 
estimates in each condition. These provide a general measure of perceptual timing ability: a 
high standard deviation across repeated trials indicates inconsistent timing performance. This 
could reflect poor temporal information about the judged event, difficulty in using the clock 
for timing judgements, erratic allocation of attention either to the action or to the clock, or 
general confusion. The data are presented in Table 3. Standard deviations across trials were 
comparable with data reported previously (Haggard et al., 2002).  For baseline judgements, 
there were no significant differences in standard deviations between controls and PD off 
(baseline action: t(16) = 1.40, p = .182; baseline tone: t(16) = .362, p = .722) and between PD 
off and PD on (baseline action: t(8) = .687, p = .512; baseline tone: t(8) = 1.05, p = .327). For 
agency conditions, there were no significant changes in standard deviations between controls 
and PD off (judgements of action for action+tone condition: t(16) = .263, p = .796; 
judgements of tone in action+tone condition: t(16) = 1.05, p = .308) and between PD off and 
PD on (judgements of action for action+tone condition: t(8) = .610, p = .559; judgements of 
tone in action+tone condition: t(8) = .702, p = .503). The absence of any significant 
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differences in this measure of timing precision suggests that time perception ability overall 
was not affected either by the disease state, or by taking of dopaminergic medication.  
Therefore, the effects on intentional binding levels shown in Table 2 are unlikely to be a 
result of general differences in timing ability, such as poor attention to time. 
 
Time-dependent  effects 
The design included a confound between time of testing and medication state. Therefore, the 
increase in binding may be due to general learning effects, such as learning, familiarity or 
fatigue, rather than drug treatment. We could not independently estimate time-dependent 
effects over the experiment as a whole. However, we were able to investigate them at a finer 
temporal scale by comparing the first and second half of each block, using the same methods 
as before.  Data from the first half of each action block and the first half of each effect block 
were used to estimate composite binding on early trials, and data from the second half of 
each action block and the second half of each effect block were used to estimate composite 
binding on late trials The data are presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
We found that composite binding for the patients was somewhat stronger for the late trials 
than for early trials, but this effect was not quite statistically significant, F(1,8) = 4.19, p = 
.075.  More importantly, there was no evidence of any interaction between the early-late and 
off-on factors, F(1,8) = .001, p = .977.   
 
Discussion 
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In this study we investigated the influence of Parkinson’s disease and dopaminergic 
medication on the temporal experience of voluntary instrumental actions, as an implicit 
measure of Sense of Agency (SoA). Both PD patients and healthy volunteers showed the 
“intentional binding” effect reported previously: actions were perceived as shifted towards 
their subsequent effects, while effects were perceived as shifted towards the preceding action 
which caused them. Although significant binding was found in each group, statistical 
analyses showed that the extent of this shift was strongest in PD patients on medication, and 
weakest in controls. These shifts serve as an index of SoA.  Dopaminergic medication 
boosted action-effect binding in PD patients relative to action-effect binding in the same 
patients off medication. Furthermore, action-effect binding in PD patients off medication was 
not significantly different from controls. These results suggest that the disease state itself is 
not associated with changes in SoA, at least in the earlier stages. Rather, changes in SoA are 
caused by dopaminergic medication used to treat the disease. Interestingly, we found a 
significant effect of dopminergic medication on overall binding, but not on the binding of the 
action or tone tested individually.  This suggests that dopamine indeed influences the 
experienced linkage between action and effect, rather than the experience of the action or 
effect alone.  The pattern of results we obtained is consistent with the group as a whole 
showing modified experience of action-effect linkage, but with some individuals expressing 
this in their experience of the action, and others in their experience of the tone.  To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to directly investigate SoA in PD and the associated impact 
of dopaminergic medication.  
 
Alternative interpretations: 
Confounds due to time of testing 
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Our study design includes a confound between time of testing and medication state. As in 
some previous studies (e.g. Corcos, Chen, Quinn, McAuley, & Rothwell, 1996; Brown, 
Corcos, & Rothwell, 1997), patients were always tested off medication first.  Therefore, any 
difference between the first off phase and the second on phase of the experiment could reflect 
either the effect of medication, or some other time-dependent effect, such as practice effects 
over the course of the experiment. The analysis of binding in the first and second half of each 
block, however, suggests that our results are not simply due to practice, learning or other 
time-dependent effects.  The modest changes in binding over the course of a block were 
equally present in the on and off conditions. This suggests that any learning/time-order effects 
are unlikely to explain the difference between the medication conditions 
 
General timing deficits 
Could it be that the exaggerated binding in PD patients on medication simply reflects general 
changes in time perception, rather than specific changes in agency experience? Our analyses 
of the standard deviation of time estimates across trials suggests not: timing judgements were 
equally consistent for PD patients on and off medication, and for patients and controls.   
 
Previous studies have suggested slowing of an internal pacemaker in PD (e.g Artieda, Pastor, 
Lacruz, & Obeso, 1992; Pastor, Artieda, Jahanshahi, & Obeso, 1992), although the data are 
somewhat inconsistent (see Ivry & Spencer, 2004, for a review).  More recent work by 
Wearden and colleagues (Wearden et al., 2008; Wearden et al., 2009) shows that central 
timing mechanisms in PD are generally spared, and that dopaminergic medication used to 
treat PD does not significantly alter time perception on a range of tasks.  This point is 
important, since a recent study showed that intentional binding was associated with a 
transient drop in temporal discrimination performance, consistent with temporary slowing of 
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an internal clock in the interval between actions and effects (Wenke & Haggard, 2009).  
However, changes in speed of an internal clock seem unlikely to explain our effect: they 
would require dopaminergic medication to slow down an internal clock, so that fewer clock 
pulses occur between action and effect.  As a result, the interval between action and effect 
would seem shorter, producing the effect seen in our composite binding data.  However, 
current opinion suggests that dopamine is likely to speed up clock function, rather than slow 
it down (Meck, 1996; Meck & Benson, 2002; Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Cheng, Ali, & Meck, 
2007).  
 
Finally, changes in clock speed should alter the precision of time estimation, as well as any 
bias (Wenke and Haggard, 2009).  However, our analysis of standard deviations across trials 
showed no significant changes in precision of time estimation.  Therefore, we think it 
unlikely that the observed changes in mean action-effect binding in our data merely reflect 
changes in a general purpose internal timing apparatus, such as that posited by scalar timing 
theory.  Our effects seem to reflect changes in the experience of action-effect linkage, rather 
than deficits in basic time perception.  
 
Cross-modal synchronisation 
Cross-modal synhcronisation judgements differ widely across individuals.  Therefore, our 
study, like several others, is based on statistical analysis of the difference between 
experimental and baseline estimates (e.g. Haggard et al 2002).  Baseline judgements vary 
widely both across people and across groups (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & 
Franck, 2003), and may reflect individual strategies in the attention paid to the clock.  In 
order to control for such individual differences, each participant’s judgement in the baseline 
condition is subtracted from their judgement in the agency conditions.  In general, a single 
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time-estimate is difficult to interpret, whereas a difference between estimates of the same 
physical event in different experimental conditions is much more interpretable (Libet et al., 
1983; Haggard, 2008).   
 
Inspection of Table 2 suggests that there were differences between groups and sessions in 
terms of baseline judgements.  Any changes in baseline are important because they contribute 
to our measure of binding effects: a change in our binding measure between conditions could 
arise from changes in action-effect linkage, or from changes in the basic perception of actions 
or tones.  In fact, differences in baseline between groups and differences between on and off 
states were never statistically significant, and their complex overall pattern did not suggest 
any general change in perception or time estimation (Meck & Benson, 2002).  The largest 
change in baseline judgements was an earlier action baseline for PD on than off.  However, 
since this change was not found either for baseline tones, or for actions followed by tones, 
explanations based on drug effects on time estimation seem ad hoc.  Moreover, we do not 
think that baseline estimates should be interpreted in isolation.  The difference between 
baseline and agency conditions in our design remains the most appropriate way to measure 
modulation of experience of agency.  Interestingly, the on-off difference in composite binding 
in our data arose from both action shifts and tone shifts that were numerically almost equal in 
size, though opposite in direction.  While the effects of medication on action binding 
involved a change in baseline action judgements, the effects on tone binding involved almost 
no change in baselines at all.  Therefore, we consider that dopaminergic modulation of 
binding cannot be fully or parsimoniously explained by changes in baseline time estimates. 
 
Finally, although our sample size is consistent with previous published work on movement 
disorders (e.g. Bloxham, Mindel, & Frith, 1984; Desmurget et al., 2004), the relatively small 
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size of the study  means that a degree of caution is required, particularly when interpreting 
null results.  In particular, while we found no significant difference between PD patients off 
medication and healthy controls, a larger sample would be required to confidently assert that 
PD does not alter the temporal experience of agency. 
 
Models of dopamine effects on cognition 
Although no previous research of which we are aware has directly investigated SoA in PD, 
our results are consistent with the reported effects of medication on cognitive function in PD. 
According to the overdose theory, the differential effects of dopaminergic medication on 
cognitive function are due to the pattern of dopamine depletion in the course of PD 
progression (Gotham et al., 1986; Gotham et al., 1988; Swainson et al., 2000; Cools et al., 
2001; Cools, 2006). In the earlier stages of the disease, dopamine in the dorsal striatum is 
more severely depleted than in the ventral striatum. Therefore, cognitive functions supported 
by the dorsal striatum are improved by dopaminergic medication, whilst cognitive functions 
supported by the ventral striatum are worsened by dopaminergic medication (there is an 
overdose).  
 
Our data lend indirect support to the overdose theory, and particularly to the suggestion that 
cognitive functions of the ventral striatum are adversely affected by DA excess. The ventral 
striatum plays a key role in instrumental learning and performance (Kelley et al., 1997; 
Smith-Roe & Kelley, 2000; Hernandez et al., 2002; O'Doherty et al., 2004). We previously 
showed that very recent reinforcement of action-effect association contributes to the binding 
effect (Moore & Haggard, 2008).  Specifically, we found that the perceived time of an action 
was more strongly shifted towards an effect when the participants had just experienced an 
action-tone pair on the immediately preceding trial, compared to when they had just 
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experienced the action without the tone.  Interpreted in this way, boosting of action-effect 
binding in PD patients on medication may be due to an overdosing of the ventral striatal 
dopamine system. This may induce exaggerated action-effect binding by strengthening 
action-effect associations. 
 
Several dopaminergic mechanisms may contribute to the experience of action-effect 
associations. On one view, phasic striatal dopamine activity encodes “prediction error”, i.e., 
degree of mismatch between expected and actual outcomes of actions (typically rewarding 
action outcomes; Schultz et al., 1997). Prediction error is also a key parameter in theories of 
causal learning (Dickinson, 1981). A recent study has shown that dopaminergic medication in 
PD patients indeed modulates striatal reward prediction error signals, and boosts formation of 
associations between actions and positive outcomes (Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, 
& Frith, 2006). Although the consequences of actions in our paradigm were not rewarding in 
themselves, we suggest exaggerated action-effect binding on medication may be similarly 
caused by modulation of phasic dopamine prediction error signals. 
 
Role of dopamine in regulation of agency 
Our study also clarifies the neural basis of SoA, by showing a clear link to dopamine.  
Several previous studies have investigated changes in SoA in schizophrenia. The positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia have been attributed to excessive dopamine (Laruelle et al., 1995; 
Abi-Dargham et al., 1998). Interestingly, schizophrenic patients also show stronger action-
effect binding than controls (Haggard et al., 2003). The similarity between effects of putative 
dysregulation of dopamine systems in schizophrenia and of dopaminergic medication in PD 
is intriguing given the fact that dopaminergic medication is known to induce psychotic-like 
symptoms in up to 30% of PD patients (Cummings, 1991). The altered experiences of action 
21 
 
that we have described could be a relevant marker for formation of drug-induced psychosis in 
some patients. 
 
Impulse control disorders are thought to occur in about 14% of PD patients on dopamine 
agonist treatment (Voon et al., 2006). At the neural level, these disorders are thought to be 
linked to excessive stimulation of dopamine receptors in the limbic striatum (Dagher & 
Robbins, 2009). This excessive stimulation may contribute to the development of such 
disorders through the promotion of instrumental action-effect associations, via increased 
learning (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2006) and incentive (Berridge & Robinson, 1998) 
signalling. We suggest that an excessive sense of agency may contribute to impulse control 
disorders.  If one perceives one’s actions as highly effective, or as highly likely to produce 
rewards, one might make actions that would otherwise be inhibited.  For example, 
pathological gambling behaviour (Voon et al., 2006) may arise because the patient has an 
abnormally heightened perception of the association between betting and winning.  The 
excessive action-effect binding in patients on medication in our study supports this line of 
reasoning. None of the patients in our sample had been diagnosed with impulse control 
disorders. However, we speculate that difficulties in impulse control should correlate with an 
excessive SoA. 
 
To conclude, this is the first direct investigation of the subjective experience of voluntary 
action in PD of which we are aware.  We used the perceived temporal association between 
actions and effects as an implicit measure of the sense of agency.  Our results showed no 
difference between healthy volunteer participants and PD patients off medication.  However, 
dopaminergic medication significantly strengthened the temporal binding between actions 
and effects, which we interpret as a heightened sense of agency.  Prediction-error learning is 
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one possible mechanism underlying this boosting of action-effect binding.  Our study sheds 
new light on the neurobiological basis of SoA, which may be relevant to other movement 
disorders and to psychiatric conditions. Moreover, it offers new avenues for research into the 
cognitive, motor and experiential effects of dopamine. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Demographic, pathology, and drug details in PD patients and controls 
 
Number Gender Age UPDRS 
(motor) 
OFF 
UPDRS 
(motor) 
ON 
Years 
(diagnosis) 
Medication (mg/day) 
1 M 66 10 7 6 Levodopa (400), Pramipexole base (2.1) 
2 M 67 23 12 3 Pramipexole base (2.1) 
3 M 60 25 14 7 Pramipexole base (3.15) 
4 F 61 39 25 13 Levodopa (300) 
5 M 56 28 12 10 Levodopa (900), Entacapone (1800), Cabergoline (3) 
6 M 70 20 7 5 Levodopa (300), Ropinirole (6), Selegiline (10) 
7 M 79 27 20 9 Levodopa (600) 
8 M 71 35 22 2 Levodopa (200), Selegiline (10) 
9 F 56 36 26 4 Pramipexole base (1.05) 
Patients  (7 Males)           
Mean (SD)  65.11 (8) 27.00 (9) 16.11 (7)        
Controls (3 Males)           
Mean (SD)  62.00 (6)          
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Table 2. Mean shifts in the experience of actions and tones for: controls, PD patients OFF medication, and the 
same PD patients ON medication.  Values in parenthesis show the SD of the mean across participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group 
 
Condition 
 
Judged event 
 
Mean (SD) 
judgement 
error (ms) 
 
Intentional 
binding: Mean 
shift of 
judgement 
error from 
baseline (ms) 
(SD) 
 
 
Significance 
level for 
mean of shift 
in judgement 
error from 
baseline 
(1-tailed) 
 
Mean (SD) 
overall action 
and tone 
binding  
 (ms)  
 
Significance 
level for 
overall 
binding 
(1-tailed) 
 
Control 
 
Baseline 
 
Action only 
Tone only 
 
-83 (77) 
 -62 (62) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Agency 
 
 
Action 
Tone 
 
-64 (63) 
 -136 (62) 
 
19  (30) 
-74 (80) 
 
p = .054 
p = .012 
 
 
92 (83) 
 
 
p = .005  
 
 
       
PD OFF 
medication 
Baseline Action only 
Tone only 
-33 (77) 
-45 (43) 
    
  
Agency 
 
 
Action 
Tone 
 
-3 (60) 
 -137 (73) 
 
30 (47) 
-92 (75) 
 
p = .043 
p = .003 
 
 
122 (84) 
 
 
p = .001 
        
PD ON 
medication 
Baseline 
 
Action only 
Tone only 
-69 (52) 
-15 (75) 
 
 
   
  
Agency 
 
 
Action 
Tone 
 
-7 (75) 
-139 (75) 
 
62 (68) 
-124 (83) 
 
p = .013 
p = .003 
 
 
186 (80) 
 
 
p =  .0001  
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Table 3. Mean standard deviations across trials for: controls, PD patients OFF medication, and the same PD 
patients ON medication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group 
 
Condition 
 
Judged event 
 
Mean standard 
deviation 
across trials  
 
Control 
 
Baseline 
 
Action only 
‘Tone only’ 
 
79  
84 
  
Agency 
 
 
Action 
Tone 
 
87  
115 
 
 
   
PD OFF 
medication 
Baseline Action only 
Tone only’ 
121 
79 
  
Agency 
 
Action 
Tone 
 
92 
92 
    
PD ON 
medication 
Baseline 
 
‘Action only’ 
‘Tone only’ 
102  
109 
  
Agency 
 
 
Action 
Tone 
 
101 
86 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1.The intentional binding effect (adapted from Haggard, 2005). A) Participants’ voluntary key-press 
actions are followed after 250 ms by an effect (a tone) B) Baseline estimates are obtained for actions occurring 
without a following tone, and tones occurring in the absence of actions. This controls for individual differences 
in the perception of these events, and provides a baseline against which to compare the time experience of the 
same events in an agency or passive context. C) In an agency context, intentional actions are perceived later and 
the effects are perceived earlier, than their respective baselines (hollow arrows). 
 
Figure 2. Trial structure in the agency conditions (see text for details) 
 
Figure 3. Intentional binding effect for (B) Healthy controls, (C) PD patients off dopaminergic treatment, and 
(D) PD patients on dopaminergic treatment. The dashed lines indicate the baseline in each condition (differences 
in baseline estimates between conditions are not shown in the figure for clarity, but are given in Table 2). 
Composite binding is the sum of the action binding and sign-reversed tone binding, and corresponds to the 
combined length of the two white arrows in each condition (arrows drawn approximately to scale).  
 
Figure 4. Magnitude of composite binding in the first half and second half of trials within agency blocks (see 
text for details). 
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